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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: WHAT IT 
IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT 
JOSÉ A. CABRANES 
INTRODUCTION 
The judges on this panel have been asked to reflect briefly on “judicial 
experiences with human rights litigation in U.S. Courts.” 
The charge is simultaneously daunting and treacherous—daunting 
because the subject covers so much terrain, and treacherous because we are 
required by our code of judicial conduct to refrain from public discussion 
of pending cases. Pending cases include cases decided in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals that may return to our Court on remand from the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  Accordingly, my remarks are not intended to intimate 
the slightest view on any pending case. Nevertheless, my comments are, 
understandably, informed by my participation in cases now closed and rely 
on some of my published work in the field. I also rely on some personal 
experience in the study of international human rights law, and pro bono 
service in one of the earliest NGOs working in the field, the International 
League for Human Rights. 
With your forbearance, I will comment on some history, including 
personal history, before circling back to the question of judicial experiences 
with litigation of this sort. 
I. HISTORY 
I turn to history for a simple reason: history matters. It matters always, 
and it is relevant always, in the law, and especially in the Anglo-American 
legal system. As Holmes famously taught us, “[t]he life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience”1—and by “experience” we of course 
mean history. 
The history of international human rights litigation in the U.S. courts 
is important—and it is important to know that this history is relatively 
 
             United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit. This is a slightly edited, and annotated, 
version of brief remarks presented at the Seminar on International Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 
convened by the Federal Judicial Center and Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina, 
April 15, 2011. 
 1.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881). 
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short. 
International human rights law in the federal courts is, of course, 
merely part of the larger international human rights movement that 
flowered in the Western world in the course of the 1970s. It is no 
coincidence, I think, that the seminal case in this field was decided by my 
Court in 1980, as this broader movement came to the fore in public life. 
That case, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,2 breathed life into the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”).3 That statute, whose very origins are a mystery, had been 
virtually unknown and untouched since its enactment as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. Filartiga literally created a whole new species of 
litigation, one aimed at harnessing the authority of the American federal 
courts to vindicate the rights of aliens who claimed to be victims of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
1980 is a year worth remembering. This is the year when international 
human rights litigation under the ATS began. 
In an important new book, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 
Professor Samuel Moyn of Columbia University locates the origins of the 
current international human rights movement in the zeitgeist of the 
1970s—not, as is so often assumed, in the post-war response to the 
Holocaust, the English (“Glorious”), French, or American Revolutions, or 
even in the worlds of the ancient Greeks or Hebrews.4 
Professor Moyn’s thesis suggests that those who celebrate the origins 
of the current international human rights movement are engaged in writing 
a kind of “Whig history”—the sort of history famously defined by the 
Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield as the writing of history to serve 
the interests of today’s reigning ideas; in effect, a look backward to serve 
the interests of today’s elites.5 
In Moyn’s view of this Whig history, international human rights 
activists today avoid recognizing that their movement is wholly novel, 
claiming to find its historical roots in Nuremberg, or in Paris, Philadelphia, 
Athens or Jerusalem.6 
Contrary to this Whig history, Professor Moyn explains that it was in 
the 1970s that “the moral world of Westerners shifted, opening a space for 
 
 2.  Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 3.  The Alien Tort Statute states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 4.  SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 5-8 (2010). 
 5.  See generally HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (Charles 
Scribner’s Sons 1951) (1931). 
 6.  MOYN, supra note 4, at 5. 
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the sort of utopianism that coalesced in an international human rights 
movement that had never existed before”7—not a movement that “implied 
a politics of citizenship at home,” but rather, “a politics of suffering 
abroad.”8 
Moyn describes the emergence of activist international human rights 
organizations like Amnesty International, betokened by the award of the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, in contrast to what he calls the “ineffectual” 
human rights organizations of the three prior decades, including most 
notably, and “ineffectual[ly],” the International League for Human Rights9 
(an “ineffectual” organization of which, as it happens, I was Vice President 
and Counsel until 1980, when I went to the federal bench). 
I cannot do justice to the depth and subtlety of Professor Moyn’s 
remarkable thesis, which is illuminating and likely controversial. But in 
describing the emergence of a new international human rights movement in 
the 1970s, he points out that the first course on international human rights 
taught in the United States was one offered at Yale Law School in 1964 by 
a now obscure, but highly significant, figure by the name of Egon 
Schwelb.10 
Dr. Egon Schwelb was an émigré Czech lawyer and international civil 
servant who had long served in the United Nations Human Rights Division 
and who, upon retirement from the U.N., went to teach at Yale Law 
School. And it is at Yale Law School where my friend and classmate, 
Judge Nina Gershon (who is also a participant in this Duke Law School 
Seminar), and I met Dr. Schwelb; Judge Gershon and I were both in 
Dr. Schwelb’s seminar nearly fifty years ago. Another member of 
Dr. Schwelb’s seminar was Luzius Wildhaber, then a graduate student at 
Yale Law School and, in due course, a distinguished Swiss international 
lawyer and a member and president of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
Dr. Schwelb was a wonderful man and a warm friend to his students. 
We treasure his memory. 
It was in Dr. Schwelb’s seminar that his students were introduced to 
the intense, scholastic reading of international human rights treaties. We 
were introduced also to their drafting history (travaux préparatoires), and 
amended drafts, year by year, article by article. The course did not 
encourage celebration of one’s politics or sanctimonious comments on 
 
 7.  Id. at 1. 
 8.  Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 9.  Id. at 60. 
 10.  Id. at 199. 
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world affairs; no political arias, and no Ode to Joy. In sum, this was an 
unusual enterprise for us, an enterprise very much in the European tradition 
of legal education, and a form of education wholly foreign to the agitated 
activism that we associate with the human rights movement about to be 
born. 
So it is with Professor Moyn’s help that I have recently learned that 
Judge Gershon and I were part of history—the early history of the newly-
emergent international human rights movement. My own surprise and 
delight at learning of my place in this history is akin to that of Molière’s 
“bourgeois gentleman,” who was surprised and delighted to learn that he 
had been speaking “prose” all of his life without knowing it.11 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE 
So the history of international human rights law (and international 
human rights litigation in particular) matters, for litigants and judges and 
for all of us. It provides us with a context in which to place the special 
challenges posed by modern human rights claims. And this history is 
exquisitely relevant, because it is only since 1980—that is, since 
Filartiga—that the federal courts have had to handle such cases. By 
coincidence, 1980 is the year I began to serve on the federal bench. 
Accordingly, while I may have been present at the creation, I have 
encountered the new international human rights movement principally 
while on the bench. 
Like other judges here today, I have sat on a wide range of cases that 
arguably fall under the rubric of “international human rights.” Some 
emerge from the traditional law-making function of multilateral treaties—
for example, cases under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations12 
and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.13 Others are the 
product of treaties that are themselves a result of the new, activist 
international human rights movement, such as the hundreds of immigration 
petitions relying on the U.N. Convention Against Torture.14 Still others 
 
 11.  MOLIÈRE, MOLIÈRE’S LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME 27 (F.M. Warren, ed., D.C. Heath & 
Co. 1899) (1670). 
 12.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 
(entered into force in U.S. Dec. 24, 1969); see, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001); Sorensen v. New York, 413 F.3d 292 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 13.  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 
(entered into force in U.S. Dec. 13, 1972); see, e.g., Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 14.  U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see, e.g., Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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require that courts interpret non-treaty law—“customary international law.” 
As we know, international law consists, in substance, of two types of 
law: treaty law and customary international law. The interpretation of 
treaties, and their application when appropriate, involves tasks that are 
familiar to reasonably well-educated judges, although reliance on some 
obscure sources may be required. It is roughly akin to the interpretation of 
domestic statutes. 
But applying customary international law, also known as “the law of 
nations,” as required by the ATS, is something altogether different. The 
ATS presents special challenges for all of us. As our Court has explained, 
 
the relevant evidence of customary international law is widely dispersed 
and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges. These difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that customary international law—as the term 
itself implies—is created by the general customs and practices of nations 
and therefore does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-
identifiable source.15 
 
These characteristics give this body of law what Professor Louis 
Henkin, a leader of the academic side of the new international human rights 
movement, called a “soft, indeterminate character.”16 This softness and 
 
 15.  Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2003). For a definition of 
customary international law, there is no more authoritative or more succinct statement than that of 
Judge Henry J. Friendly in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.: Customary international law, Judge Friendly explained, 
consists “of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings 
inter se.” 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. 
Pa. 1963)), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
Judge Friendly’s statement of basic principles was re-stated and adopted by Judge Irving R. Kaufman in 
the context of the ATS in his iconic opinion in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, which underscored that 
customary international law addresses only those “wrong[s]” that are of “mutual, and not merely 
several, concern.” 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); see also supra text 
accompanying note 2; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, J.) (quoting 
Filartiga); id. at 243 n.8. 
  On the sources of international law generally, and customary international law in particular, 
see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060; see also 
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99-103 (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting authorities on “sources” of 
international law); id. at 102 nn.35-36 and accompanying text (rejecting the notion that contemporary 
scholars engage in creation of international law as “inconsistent with the law-making processes within 
and between States,” and describing the idea as inconsistent with a “system governed by the rule of 
law”); Flores, 414 F.3d at 250-52 & nn.24-26 (on the ICJ Statute, sources and evidence of customary 
international law, and rejecting the idea that contemporary scholars engage in creation of international 
law); Remarks of Professor Jack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion, Scholars in the Construction and 
Critique of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 318 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 467-68 (2001). 
 16.  LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995). 
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indeterminacy unavoidably tempts judges to free-wheeling adjudication. As 
a result, our Court has cautioned that “in determining what offenses violate 
customary international law, courts must proceed with extraordinary care 
and restraint.”17 
In articulating the basic framework in which this care and restraint is 
applied in the exercise of our judicial powers, our Court has explained 
some basic hornbook law on the law of nations—that is, customary 
international law18—that will reveal the challenges faced by any court in an 
ATS case. 
The most important of these challenges is that the primary sources of 
customary international law are not judicial decisions as in our own 
common law, or the works of scholars, but rather, the usage and practice of 
States. 
As the late Professor Clive Parry of Cambridge University wrote of 
international law generally, “the records or evidence of international law 
are the documents or acts proving the consent of States to its rules,” and 
“[a]mong such records or evidence, treaties and practice play an essential 
part, though recourse must also be had to unilateral declarations, 
instructions to diplomatic agents, laws and ordinances, and, in a lesser 
degree, to the writings of authoritative jurists.”19 
Repeating this basic point is necessary: the consent of States to be 
bound is the indispensible basis of legitimacy in all realms of international 
law—including customary international law.20 
This elementary principle appears often to be lost on those who would 
like to define international law by reference to their values and aspirations 
rather than to the sovereign commitments of States. 
Perhaps the most important, and difficult, challenge for a court in a 
case involving customary international law is to recall always the basic rule 
that “customary international law is composed only of those rules that 
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation 
 
 17.  Flores, 414 F.3d at 248. 
 18.  Among the “classics” of international law cited in our opinions are Hersch Lauterpacht, The 
Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58 (1944); OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); and J.L. BRIERLY, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (Sir Humphrey 
Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). 
 19.  CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965) (quoting P. 
E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20, 30 
(1925)) (emphasis added and omitted from original). 
 20.  I have had occasion to speak on this subject in José A. Cabranes, International Law by 
Consent of the Governed, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 119 (2007) (Supreme Court of Indiana Lecture). 
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and mutual concern.”21 In other words, the law of nations consists only of 
those norms or rules that emerge from the relations of States inter se.22 
In the nature of things, there are likely to be relatively few such rules 
of customary international law, because the consent of States—the core 
principle of international law—is best achieved, and most readily 
comprehended by all, in the form of treaty law. We should not be surprised 
to find relatively few norms that are “specific, universal, and obligatory,”23 
and thus may be considered customary international law—apart from some 
long-established trade practices; war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(such as those identified at Nuremberg after the Second World War); and 
other basic rules governing the relations of sovereign States, where matters 
of mutual concern have indeed produced universal recognition or 
extraordinary homogeneity of State practice outside the context of a treaty. 
There is a natural temptation for judges in the common law tradition 
to find in the “soft, indeterminate” character of customary international law 
an invitation to be creative—to show their stuff—rather than rely on the 
laborious but authoritative compilations of State practice. This is a 
temptation to be resisted. Indeed, it is in service of resisting this temptation 
that the most valuable work in the field of international law often comes 
from those willing to undertake the time-consuming (and less glamorous) 
task of compiling, recording, and indexing the practices of individual 
states, from which customary international law can be ascertained; that is, 
work from authorities such as Professor Clive Parry and others, who, as the 
Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana, “by years of labor, research, 
and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat.”24 
The work of which I am speaking is, in truth, quite similar to that to 
which Judge Gershon and I were exposed in Dr. Schwelb’s seminar at Yale 
Law School. I therefore speak from experience when I say it is difficult, 
even tedious, work. But I also speak from experience when I say it is 
critically important to the practice of international law in the federal courts. 
Indeed, it is when scholars immerse themselves in the records of the 
 
 21.  Flores, 414 F.3d at 248 (emphasis added). 
 22.  See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (holding that 
customary international law includes only “those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the 
relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for 
their common good and/or in dealings inter se”), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 23.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting with approval In re Estate of 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 24.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
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practices of individual States, and diligently document the areas where 
sufficiently established norms of international law have developed, that 
courts may have confidence in looking to their work—“not for the[ir] 
speculations . . . concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really is.”25 
A simple example may be instructive. It is tempting to look to 
statements by the United Nations General Assembly or other international 
agencies or conferences for expressions of customary international law. 
Yet, when one turns to the history of that august body—to the Charter and 
other founding documents—one finds that General Assembly resolutions 
and declarations do not have the power to bind member States.26 Indeed, 
the founding member States specifically denied the General Assembly that 
power after extensively considering the issue, first at the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, held in Washington in 1944, then at the Yalta conference in 
1945, and finally at the United Nations’ founding conference, held in San 
Francisco in 1945.27 Accordingly, as our Court noted in 2003, resolutions 
of the General Assembly “are not proper sources of customary international 
law because they are merely aspirational and were never intended to be 
binding on member States of the United Nations.”28 And repeated adoption 
of such non-binding resolutions of international organizations cannot, by 
miraculous alchemy, transform those resolutions into “law”—in 
international affairs, as in basic arithmetic, one hundred times zero, is, alas, 
zero.29 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See D.W. Bowett, The General Assembly, in THE UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 3, 
9-10 (B.A. Wortley ed., 1957) (“The [General] Assembly is a deliberative body, an organ for discussion 
in the widest sense. It has, of course, power to investigate facts, to make recommendations, but it has no 
power to bind the members; it cannot take binding decisions as the Security Council can. This means, 
then, that any analogy with the legislature of a state is very misleading, for the Assembly’s functions 
cannot be legislative in the true sense. The only way in which its recommendations can become binding 
upon members is for the members to agree in advance to treat those recommendations as binding, but 
the Assembly’s recommendations themselves have no legally binding force.”); D.W. BOWETT, THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 41 (3d ed. 1975). 
 27.  I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 269 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 
2002) (describing the rejection at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco of proposals to accord General 
Assembly resolutions the power to bind member States); cf. STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE 
FIRST FIFTY YEARS 13-14 (1995) (discussing the Yalta voting formula and the veto power in the 
Security Council, which alone would be empowered to issue resolutions binding on States). 
 28.  Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 259 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 29.  One formidable example of a statement or proclamation of the General Assembly may suffice 
to underscore this simple point. In the aftermath of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Declaration”), it was the earnest hope of the first generation of 
academic students of international human rights law, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, to 
assimilate the Declaration and other general pronouncements of international organizations into 
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Treaties too, which create legal obligations on the States parties to 
them, present a challenge to those seeking to discern a norm of customary 
international law; though they surely establish international norms 
governing the relations between States parties, treaties do not by their own 
force establish rules of customary international law. The general rule was 
stated by Lord McNair: “[N]o State can be bound by any treaty provision 
unless it has given its assent . . . .”30 Nevertheless, in unusual 
circumstances, widely ratified treaties may provide some evidence of the 
customs and practices of States. It is vital to recall, however, that “treaties 
may diverge broadly from customary international law.”31 
Two crucial considerations in deciding whether a given treaty may 
reflect customary international law are the treaty’s prevalence and its actual 
implementation. “The evidentiary weight to be afforded to a given treaty 
varies greatly depending on (i) how many, and which, States have ratified 
the treaty, and (ii) the degree to which those States actually implement and 
abide by the principles set forth in the treaty.”32 Both the number of States 
and their relative influence on international affairs are essential indicators 
 
domestic law, either directly, or by a kind of judicial osmosis—that is, by its invocation and citation in 
opinions of federal judges. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the 
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982) (“The Declaration, as an 
authoritative listing of human rights, has become a basic component of international customary law, 
binding on all states, not only on members of the United Nations.”); Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law, 53 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 217, 226-27 (1959) (describing the influential effect of the Declaration on certain judicial 
opinions in the United States); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
815, 876 n.365 (1997) (noting the efforts of the Aspen Institute to “expose judges to international 
human rights law—a body of law which is largely unfamiliar to most U.S. judges” (quotation marks 
omitted)). Despite modest gains in this effort in an era when hopes for the United Nations Organization 
were still high among transnational elites, the campaign did not succeed, perhaps in part because of the 
significant decline or evaporation of confidence in the work of the General Assembly and the U.N.’s 
special conferences—a recent example being “the debacle in Durban.” See generally Tom Lantos, The 
Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 31 (Winter/Spring 2002). In any event, our Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has no legal force in American jurisprudence. Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (“[T]he Declaration does not of its own force impose 
obligations as a matter of international law.”). 
 30.  LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 162 (1961). 
 31.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 108 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 32.  Flores, 414 F.3d at 256-57. On the relevance of the practices of the United States in its 
relations with other countries, our Court has stated on more than one occasion: “While it is not possible 
to claim that the practice or policies of any one country, including the United States, has such authority 
that the contours of customary international law may be determined by reference only to that country, it 
is highly unlikely that a purported principle of customary international law in direct conflict with the 
recognized practices and customs of the United States and/or other prominent players in the community 
of States could be deemed to qualify as a bona fide customary international law principle.” Id. at 257 
n.33 (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 92 n.25). 
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of a treaty’s prevalence. As for a treaty’s actual implementation, its 
principles must be uniformly and consistently adhered to and applied by its 
States parties before it can be said to have created an obligation on non-
parties. In order for a treaty to constitute some proof of a norm of 
customary international law, then, the overwhelming majority of the States 
that have ratified it must routinely act according to its principles.33 
CONCLUSION 
I conclude where I began. In the study of customary international law 
(“the Law of Nations”)—as in all areas of the law—an understanding of 
history is important, and in particular the history of international law itself. 
It is important to understand how and when international human rights law 
emerged and the body of treaty law and customary law on which it rests. It 
is essential to understand what is, and what is not, customary international 
law—that is, what practices have been (or have not been) universally 
accepted by the nations of the world in their relations inter se. 
In sum, history—the history of international relations—is the most 
important beacon for any judge who seeks to chart the difficult shoals of 
customary international law. 
 
 
 33.  Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1940 (2002) (noting widespread non-compliance with human rights treaties by States that have ratified 
them). 
